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Aw i d eb o d yo fl i t e r a t u r eh a sd e v e l o p e di nt r a d ep o l i c yc o m p a r i n gt a r i ﬀsa n di m p o r t -
quotas. A prominent theme in this area is that the two policy instruments may not be
equivalent under a variety of situations. When tariﬀs and quotas are exogenously ﬁxed then
replacing the tariﬀ with its equivalent quota, in the sense that the two yield the same import-
volume, may generate diﬀerent equilibrium prices and output levels. The intuition for this
can be outlined in a simple “home duopoly model” where there are two countries, home
and foreign, and one ﬁrm in each country selling a homogenous good in home’s domestic
market. In the quota regime, the home-ﬁrm believes, and rationally so, that the output of
the foreign-ﬁrm is ﬁxed at the quota limit so that its “conjecture” about the rival ﬁrm’s
response to a change in its own output is simply zero.1 That is, the home-ﬁrm behaves
like a “follower”. In the tariﬀ regime, however, output of the foreign-ﬁrm is ﬂexible so that
the home-ﬁrm’s conjecture now depends on the underlying market structure (Hwang and
Mai, 1988; Itoh and Ono, 1984). Speciﬁc a l l y ,i nt h es i m p l eC o u r n o tm o d e l ,t h eh o m eﬁrm
behaves like a follower in that it treats the output of the rival ﬁrm as ﬁx e dw h e nc h o o s i n gi t s
best-response output. Since the conjecture of the home-ﬁrm is identical in the two regimes,
tariﬀs and quotas are equivalent here.2 It is simple to see from this that the equivalence
result will hold in general provided that the conjecture of the home-ﬁrm is that of a follower.
From the point of view of this paper, we can summarize the arguments above by noting
that, as perceived by the home-ﬁrm, the diﬀerential “sensitivity” (response) of equilibrium
1 Formally, this argument requires that the quota limit is always fully utilized in equilibrium. This holds
throughout in our model.
2 Brander and Spencer (1986) extend this result to Cournot oligopoly case.
1import-volume to the action chosen by the home-ﬁrm is the key factor that determines the
equivalence, or the lack of it, between the two policy tools.
In contrast to the literature discussed above, we consider the case where the tariﬀ/quota
level is endogenously determined.3 Speciﬁcally, we consider a two period (stage) game where
the home country operates under autarky in the ﬁr s tp e r i o df o l l o w e db y( o p t i m a l )t r a d e
liberalization in the second period. The critical feature of the model is that the home-ﬁrm
has private information about its true cost. A simple signaling game arises where the home-
ﬁrm can signal its true cost in the ﬁrst period (the signaling stage) before trade liberalization
is to occur. Having observed the signal, the government updates its belief about the cost
of the ﬁrm in a Bayesian manner and accordingly implements the optimal trade policy for
the second period. The two ﬁrms then compete in quantities under Cournot conjectures
in home’s domestic market. This set up broadly captures a host of real-world situations.
One example of this is that the home country initially operates under high trade barriers to
develop an “infant industry” and wants to liberalize once the industry has reached a mature
phase. The government’s lack of complete information reﬂects that it is not sure how much
the home-ﬁrm improved during the infant-industry-protection phase.
In this scenario, we ﬁrst show that tariﬀs and quotas are equivalent under complete
information. As discussed above, this follows directly from the fact that the ﬁrms hold
Cournot conjectures. Allowing for asymmetric information, we show that the government
always targets the same import-volume (and all other endogenous variables) under the two
regimes for any given belief held by it about the true cost of the home-ﬁrm. In fact a stronger
3 A sc o m m o ni nt h el i t e r a t u r ed e a l i n gw i t ht a r i ﬀs versus quotas issue, we assume that the choice of the
policy regime (tariﬀ or quota) is exogenously given. Also, we restrict policies to be either a tariﬀ or quota
but not both.
2result is derived in that in the unique signaling equilibrium of the game in the tariﬀ and quota
regime, the two Types separate out so that the identity of the home-ﬁrm is fully revealed
before policy is implemented. Consequently, endogenously determined tariﬀs and quotas are
equivalent in that they lead to identical outcome in the second stage of the game. Despite
this tariﬀ-quota equivalence in period-2 outcome, we show that the “signaling distortion” in
the ﬁr s tp e r i o di sh i g h e ri nt h eq u o t ar e g i m et h a ni nt h et a r i ﬀ regime. The non-equivalence
in period-1 outcome is entirely driven by a sensitivity eﬀect which can be easily motivated
from the following example. Suppose that the high-cost ﬁrm is successfully able to alter the
government’s belief through a credible signal that its true cost is lower than the initial belief
held by the government. As we show in the sections, this implies that the government would
like implement higher protection in order to maximize its politically motivated objective
function. In the quota regime this requires squeezing the quota limit by, say, 2 units of
imports. However if tariﬀs are used then, with the tariﬀ held ﬁxed momentarily, the change
in the government’s belief implies that the government rationally believes that the import-
volume is already lower by, say, 1 unit. As perceived by the government, and rationally so,
this is simply the “direct eﬀect” of cost movement on equilibrium import-volume. Thus,
the revision in the optimal tariﬀ is targeted to lower the import-volume by the remaining 1
unit only. In our simple linear model, the change in equilibrium import-volume through the
revision in the tariﬀ is independent of the underlying cost structure so that the equilibrium
import-volume changes by 1 units in the tariﬀ regime and by 2 units in the quota regime.
Thus, equilibrium import-volume is much more sensitive to a credible signal sent by the
private agent in the quota regime than in the tariﬀ regime. It is direct to see from this that
3this sensitivity eﬀect makes it more diﬃcult for the two Types to separate out. Consequently,
signaling distortion is higher in the quota regime leading to a non-equivalence result.
It is important to note here that our sensitivity eﬀect is completely the opposite of
the key reason put forward in the literature to explain non-equivalence between tariﬀsa n d
quotas. That is, as discussed above, when policy levels are exogenously given then non-
equivalence arises because the home-ﬁrm perceives that import-volume is rigid with quotas
in place and sensitive to its own action with the tariﬀ in place when its conjecture is diﬀerent
from that of a follower. The sensitivity eﬀect contrasts sharply from this in that it establishes
that, when policy levels are endogenously determined, then import-volume is more sensitive
in the quota regime. Thus, the paper contributes in making a more general point that the
basic intuition and results with exogenously ﬁxed policy levels cannot be extended to the
case with endogenously determined policy levels.
The structure of the remaining paper is as follows. In section 1 we set up the basic model
and derive our results under complete information. The sensitivity eﬀect is formally stated
here. In section 2 we introduce asymmetric information and deﬁne the equilibrium concept
used to derived the signaling equilibria. In section 3 we derive the signaling equilibrium
and formally prove the non-equivalence result. In section 4 we discuss the generality of the
sensitivity eﬀect in an alternative market structure. In the conclusion we summarize our
ﬁndings and suggest possible extensions of the model.
Section 1
1.1 Basic structure of the game
4We consider a partial equilibrium model with two countries called home and foreign,
a n dt w ot i m ep e r i o d si n d e x e db y1a n d2 .T h e r ea r et w og o o d s ,X and Y, with good Y being
the numeraire good. Throughout the paper we will focus on the home country. Home’s
per-period (inverse) demand function for good X is given by P = α − Xd where P is the
relative price of the good in home’s local market, Xd i st h ea m o u n to fg o o dX demanded
by all of home’s consumers and, α is a strictly positive parameter given exogenously to the
model. Home imports good X and exports Y in return to balance trade. For completeness,
assume that the foreign-agents do not consume good X. At the beginning of each period, each
country is endowed with a given amount of good Y which can be either consumed or used
to produce good X. Speciﬁcally, we will use c to denote home-ﬁrm’s marginal and average
cost of producing 1 unit of good X as measured in terms of the numeraire. The same for the
foreign-ﬁrm is assumed to be zero.4 The diﬀerent stages of the game and structure of the
informational asymmetry are as follows.5
At the beginning of the ﬁrst period, “nature” assigns a non-negative value to c,d r a w n
from an underlying distribution function. This remains unchanged for the rest of the game.
T ok e e pt h em o d e ls i m p l e ,w ea s s u m et h a tc can take two possible values denoted by cH and
cL, where cH >c L. The properties of the distribution function are common knowledge to all
the players. Let θo denote the “prior” probability that c = cL. At this stage of the game, c is
4 Our results are not aﬀected in any way by assuming that foreign’s cost is equal to zero.
5 The structure of demand and production outlined above for the home country can be formally derived by
assuming a quasi-linear utility function for a representative home agent as given by Cy +αCx−LC
2
x/2,w h e r e
L is the total number of agents in the home country. Similarly, the production structure can be obtained
from a Ricardian technology where 1 unit of labor is required to produce 1 unit of Y and c units of labor to
make 1 unit of good X.
5observed by the home-ﬁrm and the foreign-ﬁrm but not by the home-government.6 There is
no trade in period 1 so that the home-ﬁrm enjoys monopoly in the domestic market. Thus,
as discussed in the introduction, this period serves as the signaling stage of the game. Having
observed the value of c, the home-ﬁrm chooses its output level for this period. Consumption
takes place and utilities are realized. The government observes the choice made by its ﬁrm
and updates its belief about the value of c. It implements the optimal tariﬀ/quota for the
second period of the game. If the optimal policy is non-prohibitive, then the two ﬁrms choose
their output levels simultaneously as in a standard Cournot duopoly game with quantity
competition. The game ends with markets being cleared and utilities realized for all agents
for the second period (stage) of the game.
Since the home country operates under autarky in the ﬁrst period, the issue of tariﬀs
versus quotas in irrelevant here. Consequently, our focus will be on the choice of policy levels
for the second period of the game. As common in the literature, we assume that the choice
of policy regime (tariﬀs or quotas) is exogenous to the model. The aim of the paper is to
analyze whether tariﬀs and quotas lead to the same outcome in the two periods or not. To
this end, let t denote home’s speciﬁct a r i ﬀ on its imports in the second period and measured
in terms of the numeraire good. Similarly, let q denote the import-quota limit in this period.
The values of t,q will be endogenously determined. Throughout the paper we will assume
that t,q are non-prohibitive and imply equilibrium import-volumes strictly less than the free
trade level as this property will be satisﬁed in the equilibria that we derive.
We assume that the objective of the government in the second period is politically
6 The motivation for this form of informational asymmetry is that the ﬁrms are likely to have better
information about the industry structure than the government. For a similar approach see, for example,
Brainard and Martimort, 1997.
6motivated. That is, the government maximizes the sum of pure national welfare and β times
the (producer) surplus of the home-ﬁrm, where β is a non-negative parameter and given
exogenously. A higher value of β implies that the government is more concerned about the
welfare of its ﬁrm (the lobby) relative to national welfare. Our main results hold when
the government maximizes pure national welfare which can be seen by setting β equal to
zero. We assume that tariﬀ revenue/quota rent is distributed back to home’s consumers in
a lump-sum fashion. Further, the ownership of the home-ﬁrm is assumed to be extremely
concentrated so that its objective is to maximize its proﬁt in the conventional sense.7
1.2.1 Complete information solution
With complete information there is no dynamic link between the two periods. Thus,
period 1 outcome is given by the home-ﬁrm choosing its monopoly output level and the
second period solution is the standard Cournot duopoly-outcome with optimal tariﬀ/quota
in place. Let Xh(Xf) denote the output of the home-ﬁrm (foreign-ﬁrm) in the second period.
We have that, for any given t, Xh =( α − 2c + t)/3 and Xf =( α − 2t + c)/3.T h eo v e r a l l
welfare of the government is equal to
Gt(t,c) ≡
(2α − c − t)2
18
+ t
α − 2t + c
3
+( 1+β)
(α − 2c + t)2
9
The ﬁrst term on right-hand side (RHS) of the previous identity is the consumer surplus
from the consumption of good X, the second one is the tariﬀ revenue and the third term is
the weighted producer surplus in sector X.
In order to derive the corresponding expression for the quota regime we ﬁrst need to
7 This assumption is common in the literature and implies that the home-ﬁrm’s output decision is inde-
pendent of tariﬀ revenue/quota rent considerations and the prices that owners of the ﬁrm may themselves face
as consumers. For more details on this point, see, for example, Grossman and Helpman, 1994, pp. 846-847.
7state how the quota rent is distributed between the home-government and the foreign-ﬁrm.
As is well-known in the literature, this can be quite arbitrary ranging from the government
appropriating all of it to nothing. To ensure that non-equivalence between tariﬀs and quotas
does not arise due to this arbitrariness, we benchmark the quota-rent rule such that if a tariﬀ
is replaced by a quota such that the two generate the same import-volume then the quota
rent accruing to the government must equal the tariﬀ revenue. Thus, with QR(q) denoting
the quota-rent accruing to the government when the quota limit is set at q, the above rule
implies that: QR(q)=( q/2)(α − 3q + c). The market outcome for any given q is given by
Xf = q, Xh =( α − c − q)/2. We note here that the solution implies that the quota limit is
always fully utilized by the foreign ﬁrm. A formal proof of this is stated in Appendix A1.
Home government’s overall welfare in the quota regime is equal to
Gq(q,c) ≡
(α − c + q)2
8
+ q
α + c − 3q
2
+( 1+β)
(α − q − c)2
4
The ﬁrst term on RHS of the previous identity is the consumer surplus from good X, the
second is the quota rent accruing to the government and the third term is the weighted
producer surplus in sector X.
Using the Gt(.),G q(.) functions, we can derive the optimal tariﬀ and quota levels. Let
these be denoted by t(c),q (c) respectively. We have that:
t(c)=








8(i) β < (α +3 cL)/(2α − 2cL)
(ii) α > 2cH
The assumption is necessary and suﬃcient to ensure that the optimal tariﬀ/quota levels
stated above are strictly interior8 and that all equilibrium prices, output level of each ﬁrm,
are strictly positive.9 It can be checked that under the assumption, the second order
maximization condition for optimal tariﬀ and quota is globally satisﬁe d .W ea l s on o t et h a t
the assumption implies that 9 − 2β > 0.
With the above solution in place, we state our ﬁr s tr e s u l ta sf o l l o w s .
Lemma 1
Tariﬀs and quotas are equivalent under complete information. Equilibrium prices, output
levels, welfare of all agents and the government’s overall welfare is the same in the two policy
regimes in each period.
I n t u i t i o nf o rL e m m a1h a sa l r e a d yb e e nd i s c u s s e di nt h ei n t r o d u c t i o na n di tc o n ﬁrms
the ﬁndings in the literature that in the simple Cournot model, tariﬀs and quotas are equiv-
alent. Thus, any non-equivalence between tariﬀs and quotas must be due to informational
asymmetry discussed later in the paper.
1.2.2 Solution for arbitrarily given belief
We now consider the solution for any arbitrary given belief of the government about
t h et r u ec o s to ft h eh o m e - ﬁrm. That is, let θ denote the probability that the government
8 Interior solution for the optimal tariﬀ/quota here means that these are non-prohibitive and generate an
import-volume strictly below the free trade level.
9 When Assumption A1 is violated then we get a corner solution for either c = cL or c = cH or for both.
Our results are unaﬀected when the corner solution applies at either cL or cH but not both. With a corner
solution at cL and cH, optimal policy is either free trade or autarky. In both these cases, optimal protection
is invariant to the government’s belief about the true cost of the home-ﬁrm so that signaling issue is then
irrelevant.
9attaches to c = cL and 1 − θ to c = cH. We treat θ as exogenously ﬁxed in this sub-section.
The government maximizes its expected welfare which is equal to θGt(t,cL)+(1−θ)Gt(t,cH)
in the tariﬀ regime and equal to θGq(q,cL)+( 1− θ)Gq(q,cH) in the quota regime. Solving
for the optimal tariﬀ w eg e tt h a tt h i si se q u a lt ot(˜ c) and the optimal quota is equal to q(˜ c),
where ˜ c ≡ θcL +( 1− θ)cH and t(.),q(.) functions are as derived above.
We are now in a position to state our next Lemma which will prepare the ground to
show that the sensitivity eﬀect deﬁned later in the only reason for the non-equivalence result
that we will ﬁnally establish.
Lemma 2
For any θ ∈ [0,1], the government targets the same value of equilibrium import-volume and
all other endogenous variables under t(˜ c) and q(˜ c).
Proof: See Appendix A2.
Lemma 2 prepares the ground to better understand the importance of the sensitivity
eﬀect deﬁned below. It strengthens the ﬁndings in Lemma 1 in that it shows that tariﬀs
and quotas are equivalent in the expected value sense. Our ﬁnal solution features a unique
equilibrium in each policy regime which is a separating equilibrium. This implies that the
government knows the true cost of the ﬁrm before trade policy is implemented so that the
ﬁndings in Lemma 2 are not directly applicable to our results. However, it will be useful in
interpreting the “out of equilibrium” beliefs which are critical in sustaining the separating
equilibrium.
1.3 Sensitivity eﬀect
Consider a hypothetical situation where the government’s belief (about the true cost of
10the home-ﬁrm) changes from cH to cL. That is, the government initially believed that its
ﬁrm was a high-cost Type but revises it to being a low-cost Type. From equation (2) we note
that this change in the belief implies that the optimal quota limit, and thus the equilibrium
import-volume, will be lower by amount
λq ≡ |q(cL) − q(cH)| =( 3+2 β)(cH − cL)/(9 − 2β)
Next we note that the if tariﬀs are used instead, then the change in the optimal tariﬀ implies
that equilibrium import-volume will fall by amount
λt ≡ |(−2/3)[t(cL) − t(cH)]| =( 8 /3)β(cH − cL)/(9 − 2β)
The sensitivity eﬀect can now be formally stated as follows.
Deﬁnition: Sensitivity eﬀect
λq > λt.10
The interpretation of the sensitivity eﬀect is as follows. Following the stated change in
the government’s belief, it is direct to check from q(c) and t(c) functions that the government
would now like to impose a lower quota limit and a higher tariﬀ.F r o mLemma 2i tf o l l o w s
that the government intends to achieve the same change in import-volume in the quota and
tariﬀ regimes. In the quota regime, the change in equilibrium import-volume is always equal
to the change in the quota limit since this is always binding. Thus, the intended change
in import-volume is equal to λq in absolute value which is achieved in the quota regime.
Now consider the tariﬀ regime. With the tariﬀ held ﬁxed momentarily, the change in the
10 The inequality is evident from the fact that 9 − 2β > 0 as discussed above. We restate here that when
this inequality does not hold then signaling motives are completely irrelevant and the optimal tariﬀ/quota
features either autarky or free trade.
11government’s belief implies that it rationally believes that import-volume will be lower by
amount (cH−cL)/3 which can be seen from the expression for Xf (for the tariﬀ regime) stated
above. This is simply the “direct eﬀect” of the change in c on equilibrium import-volume as
perceived by the government. Naturally, this direct eﬀect is completely absent in the quota
regime. The revision in the tariﬀ is thus intended to lower import-volume by the remaining
amount equal to λq − (cH − cL)/3=λt. It is important to note that the actual (realized)
change in import-volume due to the revision in the optimal tariﬀ and quota is as anticipated
by the government. That is, equal to λq in the quota regime and λt in the tariﬀ regime.
This result follows directly from the linear structure of the model where the actual changes
in import-volume due to a change in the value of t,q, are independent of the true cost of
the home-ﬁrm. Clearly, what is not realized is the direct eﬀect referred to above so that the
actual change in import-volume is larger (in absolute value) in the quota regime than in the
tariﬀ regime. Thus, we summarize our ﬁndings here by noting that import-volume is more
sensitive in the quota regime than in the tariﬀ regime to a given change in the government’s
belief about the true cost of the home-ﬁrm. The result suggests that the high-cost ﬁrm will
have greater incentive to mimic the low-cost ﬁrm in the quota regime because by doing so it
can get a larger reduction in import-volume resulting in higher proﬁt for it. We conﬁrm this
intuition in the next section and establish our non-equivalence result on this feature.
It is direct to verify that the sensitivity eﬀect as deﬁned above holds for marginal changes
in the value of θ too. We chose to describe it for a discrete change above because this will
be relevant for our results in the next section.
Section 2
12With the solution for arbitrarily given beliefs determined above, the remaining task is
to derive the structure of equilibrium beliefs and the outcome in the ﬁrst period of the game.
To this end, we deﬁne the following functions:
S : {L,H} → R+ where R+ =[ 0 ,∞)
B : R+ → [0,1]
T :[ 0 ,1] → R+ and Q :[ 0 ,1] → R+.
The interpretation of these functions is as follows. L denotes the case when c = cL and H is
equivalent to c = cH.Sdeﬁnes the strategy of the home-ﬁrm in period 1 as a function of its
Type. We will use this notation for the tariﬀ and quota regimes as the distinction between
the two cases will be evident. The same remark applies to the function B which gives the
probability that the government assigns to c = cL as a function of the output chosen by the
home-ﬁrm in the ﬁrst period. The function T describes the tariﬀ chosen by the government
in the second period as a function of the government’s belief (value of B(.)) while Q is the
quota limit chosen by the government in the second period as function of its belief.
We next deﬁne the total proﬁt of the home-ﬁrm which in the sum of its proﬁts in the
two time periods. For any {S,B,T,i},i∈ {L,H}, we denote the total payoﬀ of the (home)
ﬁrm by V (S(i),T(B),i), where
V (S(i),T(B),i) ≡ (α − S(i) − ci)S(i)+( α − ci +2 T(B))2/9. The same in the quota regime
is given by W(S(i),Q(B),i) ≡ (α − S(i) − ci)S(i)+( ( α − Q(B) − ci)2/4.
To solve for the equilibrium values of S,B,T,Q, we impose the following restrictions on
the solution.
(E1) Sub game perfection: Given T,Q, the outcome in the second period is the Cournot
13outcome as stated in the previous section with t = T(B),q= Q(B), θ = B(.).
(E2) Sequential rationality: This restriction requires that equilibrium strategies are sequen-
tially rational, in that each player’s strategy maximizes his expected payoﬀ,g i v e nh i sb e l i e f s
and the strategy of his opponents. That is, the following condition holds:
T(B(.)=θ)=t(˜ c), S(i) ∈ argmaxS(i) V (S(i),T(B),i) in the tariﬀ regime. For the quota
regime we require Q(B(.)=θ)=q(˜ c) and, S(i) ∈ argmaxS(i) W(S(i),Q(B),i). Note that
t(˜ c),q (˜ c) functions are as derived above.
(E3) Bayes consistency: The belief function must be Baye’s consistent with respect to the
strategy, S. That is:
(i) S(L)=S(H)=Xp =⇒ B(Xp)=θo where Xp ∈ [0,∞), and
(ii)S(L)=XL 6= S(H)=XH =⇒ B(XH)=0and B(XL)=1 .
In case (i) pooling occurs in that the output chosen by the ﬁrm provides no information
about the true cost of the home-ﬁrm. Bayesian updating then requires the posterior belief
(B) to equal the prior belief (θo). In contrast to this, in cases (ii) output choices separate
the ﬁrm Types. Consequently, Bayesian updating requires the government to correctly guess
the ﬁrm’s Type. As common in the literature, the Bayesian rule above does not specify
the “out of equilibrium beliefs”. That is, case (i) does not impose any restrictions on the
value of B(X 6= Xp). Similarly, case (ii) does not impose any restriction on the value of
B(X) / ∈ {S(L),S(H)}. This problem with Bayes rule is well known in the literature. It
arises because out of equilibrium events are zero probability events and Bayes rule cannot
be applied to such events.
(E4) Intuitive beliefs: We assume that the belief function, B, satisﬁes the Cho-Kreps (1987)
14Intuitive Criterion. That is, if a deviant output level X/ ∈ {S(L),S(H)} is observed that
could possibly improve upon the equilibrium proﬁt only for a low-cost (high-cost) ﬁrm, then
the government should believe that the home ﬁrm has low (high) cost. Speciﬁcally, in the
tariﬀ regime, for any given {S,T}, beliefs are intuitive under the following condition:
∀X/ ∈ {S(L),S(H)},B(X)=I(J), where I(J) is such that I(L)=1 ,I (H)=0 , if for J 6= J0
∈ {L,H} :
V (X,T(1),J) ≥ V (S(J),T(B(S(J))),J) and,
V (X,T(1),J0) <V(S(J0),T(B(S(J0))),J0)
For the quota regime the restriction is the same with V (.) replaced by W(.) and T(.) replaced
by Q(.).
(E5) Pessimistic beliefs: Lastly, following the signaling literature, if a deviant output is
observed (i.e. X/ ∈ {S(L),S(H)}) and the intuitive criterion does not apply then this is
followed by the most pessimistic belief (i.e. B(X)=0 ) .11
We deﬁne a triplet {S,B,T} to be an intuitive equilibrium in the tariﬀ regime if it
satisﬁes E1-E5. Similarly for {S,B,Q} in the quota regime. An intuitive equilibrium with
S(L) 6= S(H) constitutes a separating intuitive equilibrium and an intuitive pooling equilib-
rium otherwise.
Section 3
The derivation of the intuitive equilibria in the two regimes is relatively simple since
the appropriate version of the single crossing property is satisﬁed. That is, if the high-cost
11 This assumption is common in the literature. Also, it is standard in the literature to impose further
restrictions on out of equilibrium beliefs to narrow the set of possible equilibria. This is not relevant for our
model since the equilibrium concept deﬁned above ensures that there is a unique equilibrium in both the
policy regimes.
15ﬁrm is indiﬀerent between any two output-tariﬀ (output-quota limit) pair, then the low-cost
ﬁrm strictly prefers the one with a higher output level and no lower (higher) tariﬀ (quota
limit). Further, the optimal protection is higher (higher tariﬀ and lower quota limit) for
the low-cost ﬁrm than for the high-cost ﬁrm. These features imply that there is a unique
equilibrium in the two regimes which is a separating intuitive equilibrium with the property
that the period-1 output of the low-cost ﬁrm is the conventional least costly way of signaling
its true cost. This is stated formally in the following Proposition.
Proposition 1
(a) Period 2 outcome: Equilibrium prices, output of both the ﬁrms and welfare of all the
agents including the home-government is exactly the same in period-2 in the tariﬀ and quota
regimes. Equilibrium tariﬀ is equal to t(c) and quota limit is equal to q(c) for c ∈ {cL,c H}.
B(S(H)) = 0 and B(S(L)) = 1. Thus, in period 2 we observe that the complete information
solution is realized with tariﬀs and quotas being equivalent here.
(b) Period 1 outcome: S(H)=( α − cH)/2 ≡ Xm
H in the tariﬀ and quota regime where Xm
H
is the monopoly output of the high-cost ﬁrm. For convenience in stating the value of S(L)
we introduce the following notations. Let Xm
L ≡ (α − cL)/2 which is the monopoly output
of the low-cost ﬁrm; ∆c ≡ cH − cL and, πH ≡ (4α − 6cH)/(9 − 2β) > 0 which is the proﬁt
of the high-cost ﬁrm in the second period under complete information when the optimal
tariﬀ/quota is in place. The solution value of S(L) i nt h et w or e g i m e si sa sf o l l o w s .






















Proof: For the proof and explicit expressions for the solution in (3), (4), see Appendix B.
Interpretation of the solution
The solution stated in Proposition 1 shows that there is a unique equilibrium in each
regime where the two types separate out. This result follows from the underlying structure
of the model which ensures that the appropriate version of the single crossing property is
satisﬁed as discussed above. As noted in the signaling literature, this implies that the unique
equilibrium is the standard least costly “no-mimicking” equilibrium.
Since the two types separate out, the government knows the true cost of the home-ﬁrm
at the end of the ﬁrst period and before policy is implemented. Thus, the period 2 solution
is simply the complete information solution which, given Counrot-conjectures, is exactly the
same in the tariﬀ and the quota regime. This is conﬁrmed in part (a) of the Proposition.
For period 2 outcome, we ﬁrst note that the high-cost ﬁrm always chooses its monopoly
output level (Xm
H). This result is well-known in the literature and arises because in the
separating equilibrium the identity of the high-cost is fully revealed so that it has no incentive
to deviate from its proﬁt maximizing output level. Thus, the non-equivalence between tariﬀs
and quotas in our model relates to the value of S(L) as stated in equations (3) and (4) above.
From these equations it is evident that any non-equivalence must arise due to the diﬀerence
in the values of λt and λq which, by deﬁnition, is due to the sensitivity eﬀect deﬁned earlier.
To see this, we ﬁrst note that substituting the values of λt,λq,πH in (3) and (4) we get
ac r i t i c a lv a l u eo f∆c, ∆cq, such that for ∀∆c<∆cq,S (L) >X m
L in the quota regime.
17Similarly, ∀β > 0, ∃∆c = ∆ct such that ∀∆c<∆ct, S(L) >X m
L in the tariﬀ regime.12 This
result is standard in the signaling literature in that the signaling distortion (as reﬂected in
the previous inequality) arises when the two types are not too diﬀerent. From (3) and (4) it is
evident that ∆cq > ∆ct since λq > λt. Thus, we get the ﬁrst form of non-equivalence between
tariﬀs and quotas when ∆cq > ∆c>∆ct so that in the unique separating equilibrium the
low-cost ﬁrm chooses its monopoly output in the tariﬀ regime but a strictly higher output in
the quota regime. The intuition for this is that the incentive to mimic is much higher in the
q u o t ar e g i m et h a ni nt h et a r i ﬀ regime due to the sensitivity eﬀect so that while the high-cost
Type would mimic the low-cost type in the quota regime but not in the tariﬀ regime. A
special case of this arises when the home government maximizes its pure national welfare so
that β =0 . It is direct to verify that in this case λt =0since the optimal tariﬀ is invariant to
t h et r u ec o s to ft h eh o m eﬁrm, however, λq > 0. Thus, we get that in this case S(L)=Xm
L
in the tariﬀ regime ∀∆c, while in the quota regime S(L) >X m
L for all ∆c<∆cq.
Now consider the remaining possibility when ∆c is strictly less than ∆cq and ∆ct so that
t h eo u t p u to ft h el o w - c o s tT y p ei sd i s t o r t e db e y o n dXm
L in both the policy regimes. From
(3) and (4) it evident that in this case too the signaling distortion is greater in the quota
regime than in the tariﬀ regime since λq > λt. The reason for this is exactly the same as
noted above; that is, since equilibrium import-volume in the quota regime is more sensitive
to the signal sent by the home-ﬁrm than in the tariﬀ regime, the incentive to mimic is much
higher in the former regime. Thus, the low-cost Type has to distort its output more in order
to credibly signal its Type.
12 For explicit expressions of ∆ct and ∆cq, see Appendix B3 and B4.
18Welfare implications of the stated non-equivalence can be obtained from the results
above. Since the home-ﬁrm enjoys a monopoly in the ﬁrst period, a larger output level
under the quota regime implies higher national welfare for the home country through greater
consumer surplus net of lower producer surplus of the ﬁrm. However, if the government
attaches a suﬃciently higher weight to the welfare of the ﬁrm (β is suﬃciently high) then
the tariﬀ regime will be superior from the government’s point of view since the output of the
home-ﬁrm is closer to its monopoly output level in this case.13
We now proceed to the next section where we put forward an alternative environment
and show that the sensitivity eﬀect as deﬁned above is still preserved.
Section 4
In this section we provide an example to show that the sensitivity eﬀect is likely to be
replicated in alternative environments also. Speciﬁcally, we consider the situation similar to
the one above with the foreign-ﬁrm being the leader and the home-ﬁrm being the follower in
the second period. The rest of the model is kept intact.
We ﬁrst note that in this foreign-leadership model, tariﬀs and quotas are equivalent under
complete information. This holds whether policy levels are exogenously set or endogenously
determined. The simple intuition for this follows the one in Hwang and Mai. Brieﬂy, in the
tariﬀ regime, the home-ﬁrm being the follower takes the output of the foreign-ﬁrm as given
and chooses its best response output level. Now replace the tariﬀ with a quota at the original
13 We have not stated formally why home operates under autarky in the ﬁrst period. Our motivation,
as stated in the introduction, was that it could either due to an “infant industry” phase or due to political
reasons. Without specifying the exact nature of the government’s objective here, it is not possible to say
which is the more preferred policy tool. However, our non-equivalence will hold in general for any given
objective of the government in the ﬁrst period.
19import-volume level. With the quota limit in place, the home-ﬁrm again takes treats the
output of the foreign-ﬁrm as ﬁxed. Thus, its conjecture is exactly the same in the two cases,
implying that its best response output is unchanged. With this in place, equilibrium prices
and welfare of all agents is left unchanged.14 Thus, any non-equivalence between the two
policy tools must be due to the informational asymmetry.
The sensitivity eﬀect c a nb ee a s i l yd e m o n s t r a t e di nt h i sm o d i ﬁed game as follows. As-
sume interior solutions throughout as this will hold in the ﬁnal equilibrium. For any given
output of the foreign ﬁrm denoted by Xf, home-ﬁrm’s best response output level is equal to
(α−Xf −c)/2. Solving the equilibrium of the game for any given tariﬀ t, we get that equilib-
rium import-volume is equal to ˆ Xf =( α + c − 2t)/2 which is the usual Stackelberg-solution
for the leader. From this we can compute home government’s overall welfare which is equal
to
(1.5α − 0.5c − t)2/8+
αt + ct − 2t2
2
+( 1+β)(0.5α − 1.5c + t)2/4
The ﬁrst term in the previous expression is the consumer surplus from good X, the sec-
ond is the tariﬀ revenue and the third is the weighted producer surplus of the home-ﬁrm.
Diﬀerentiating the welfare function and solving we get home’s optimal tariﬀ is equal to:
ˆ t(c)=[ ( 1 .5+β)α−(3β+0.5)c]/(5−2β). For any arbitrary belief of the government denoted
by θ, we get that the optimal tariﬀ equals ˆ t(˜ c) where ˜ c is as deﬁned above. To compute the
optimal quota limit, we benchmark the quota-rent rule as in the previous section such that
if a tariﬀ and quota generate the same import-volume then the quota-rent accruing to the
14 To be more precise, the argument requires that the quota limit is always fully utilized. This is normally
assumed in the literature and holds in our model. The proof of this can be constructed along the lines provided
in Appendix A1 for the Cournot model.
20government must equal the tariﬀ revenue. This gives us the quota rent accruing to the home
government as equal to (qα+qc−2q2)/2. Computing the government’s welfare and then the
optimal quota limit we get the latter is equal to: ˆ q(c)=[ ( 1− 2β)α +( 2 β +3 ) c]/(5 − 2β).
For any given θ, the optimal quota is given by ˆ q(˜ c). It can be checked that under complete
information, equilibrium values of all endogenous variables are exactly the same in the two
policy regimes.
We now note the sensitivity eﬀect.T h a t i s , dˆ q(˜ c)/dθ =[ ( 2 β +3 ) /(5 − 2β)]d˜ c/dθ and
d ˆ Xf/dθ =[ ( 3 β +0.5)/(5−2β)]d˜ c/dθ. It is direct to verify that |dˆ q(˜ c)/dθ| >
¯ ¯ ¯d ˆ Xf/dθ
¯ ¯ ¯ under
the interior solution condition that 5−2β > 0. This result conﬁrms that the sensitivity eﬀect
holds here. The rest of the solution can be derived as in the previous section. Since the
reduction in import volume is larger in the quota regime, it follows that the low-cost ﬁrm
must distort its output in period 1 above its monopoly output level to a greater extent in
this regime as compared to in the tariﬀ regime.15
Conclusion
The paper aims to contribute to the literature on tariﬀsv e r s u sq u o t a sa tag e n e r a ll e v e l
a n dh i g h l i g h tt h er o l eo fa s y m m e t r i ci n f o r m a tion in this area in particular. Under complete
information and when tariﬀs and quotas are exogenously ﬁxed at equivalent levels, non-
equivalence between the two policy tools has been shown to arise because import-volume in
the quota regime is ﬁxed but is sensitive to the action of the private agents when tariﬀsa r e
used. However, in this paper we have shown that under asymmetric information and when
policy levels are endogenously set then equilibrium import-volume is much more sensitive to
15 It can be checked that the appropriate version of the single crossing property holds here so that there
will be a unique signaling equilibrium in the two regimes where the two Types will separate out.
21the signal sent by the private agent when quotas are used as compared to when tariﬀsa r e




Claim: The quota limit is always fully utilized by the foreign-ﬁrm.
Proof: For any given output of the home-ﬁrm denoted by Xh, foreign ﬁrm’s total proﬁtb y
selling amount Xf is equal to (α − Xf − Xh)Xf − QR(Xf).D i ﬀerentiating foreign ﬁrm’s
proﬁt function with respect to Xf we get that this is equal to π0
f ≡ (α−c−Xh)/2+Xf. In
equilibrium, home ﬁrm must be on its reaction function implying that: Xh =( α−c−Xf)/2.
Substituting this value of Xh in π0
f expression, it is direct to verify that π0
f > 0. Thus, the
foreign-ﬁrm will always ﬁnd it proﬁtable to utilize the quota limit fully.
Q.E.D.
Appendix A2
Proof of Lemma 2
When q(˜ c) is implemented then the actual (ex-post) import-volume is equal to q(˜ c) irre-
spective of the actual value of c. Thus, the expected import-volume here is simply equal
to q(˜ c). When t(˜ c) is implemented then the actual import-volume when c = ci is equal to
(α − 2t(˜ c)+ci)/3, i = L,H. The expected value of this is equal to (α − 2t(˜ c)+˜ c)/3. Sub-
stituting for t(˜ c) from section 1, it is direct to verify that the expected import-volume under
t(˜ c) is equal to q(˜ c).
Q.E.D.
Appendix A3
Claim: |q0(˜ c)d˜ c/dθ| > |(−2/3)t0(˜ c)d˜ c/dθ| as stated in section 1.3.
Proof: d˜ c/dθ = cL−cH < 0.t 0(˜ c)=−4β/(9−2β) < 0 and, q0(˜ c)=( 3 + 2 β)/(9−2β) > 0. Sub-
23stituting we get that |q0(˜ c)d˜ c/dθ| =





= |(−2/3)t0(˜ c)d˜ c/dθ|.
Note that the previous inequality holds if and only if 9 − 2β > 0 which is guaranteed under
Assumption A1. It can be easily checked that Assumption A1 is suﬃcient but not necessary
for this inequality to hold. Speciﬁcally, in the context of our linear model, the result will
hold when the optimal tariﬀ under complete information is strictly interior.
Q.E.D.
Appendix B
Appendix B1: Proof of Proposition 1
Claim: There is no intuitive pooling equilibrium in the tariﬀ regime.
Proof: Consider a possible pooling equilibrium with S(L)=S(H)=Xp,B (Xp)=θo and
T(B(Xp)) = t(˜ co), where ˜ co ≡ θocL +( 1− θo)cH, the function t(.) is as deﬁned in equation
(1). A necessary condition for this to be an equilibrium is that no Type should do better by
unilaterally deviating to its monopoly output followed by the worst possible beliefs. That
is, V (Xp,t(˜ co),L) ≥ V (Xm
L ,t(cH),L) and V (Xp,t(˜ co),H) ≥ V (Xm
H,t(cH),H). It is trivial
to note that V (0,t(cL),H) <V (Xm
H,t(cH),H) since the RHS of the inequality is strictly
higher than πH while its LHS is strictly than πH where πH is the period 1 monopoly proﬁt
of the high-cost ﬁrm. From the previous two inequalities it follows that V (0,t(cL),H) <
V (Xp,t(˜ co),H). Next note that V (Xm
H,t(cL),H) >V(Xp,t(˜ co),H) since t(cL) >t (˜ co). From
the continuity of the all our functions, the previous two inequalities imply that ∃Y1 ∈ (0,Xm
H)
such that V (Y1,t(cL),H)=V (Xp,t(˜ co),H). Next note that the function V (Y1,t(cL),H) is
symmetric in Y1 around Xm
H, is strictly concave in Y1 and achieves its maximum value at
Y1 equal to Xm
H. These properties together with the previous equality imply that ∃Y2 =
24Xm
H + Xm
H − Y1 such that V (Y2,t(cL),H)=V (Xp,t(˜ co),H) with Y2 >X p and that:
V (Y2 + ²,t(cL),H) <V(Xp,t(˜ co),H) for ∀²>0 ......... (B1.1)
The remaining proof is straightforward. Note that V (Xp,t(˜ co),L) >V(Xp,t(˜ co),H) since
Type L has lower cost. Similarly, V (Y2,t(cL),L) >V(Y2,t(cL),H). The important property
to note next is that V (Y2,t(cL),L)−V (Y2,t(cL),H) >V(Xp,t(˜ co),L)−V (Xp,t(˜ co),H). This
can be seen by noting that LHS of this inequality is equal to Y2∆c+(4∆c/9)(α+t(cL)−(cL+
cH)), a n di t sR H Si se q u a lt oXp∆c +( 4 ∆c/9)(α + t(˜ co) − (cL + cH)).N o t i n gt h a tY2 >X p
and t(cL) >t (˜ co), the previous inequality is established. Noting the previous inequality
and the result above that V (Y2,t(cL),H)=V (Xp,t(˜ co),H), we get that V (Y2,t(cL),L) >
V (Xp,t(˜ co),L). Since V (X,.) in continuous in X, previous inequality then implies that:
V (Y2 + ²,t(cL),L) >V(Xp,t(˜ co),L) for ² ≈ 0 ......... (B1.2)
From the inequalities in (B1.1) and (B1.2) it follows that there exists ² ≈ 0 such that under
the Cho-Kreps intuitive criterion, B(Y2 + ²)=1for any possible Xp value. It is direct to
note from this result and (B1.2) that the low-cost ﬁrm will deviate from Xp to Y +². Thus,
our initial supposition that Xp is a possible intuitive pooling equilibrium is contradicted.
Q.E.D.
Appendix B2
Claim: There is no intuitive pooling equilibrium in the quota regime.
Proof: The proof is exactly the same as in Appendix B1 in the following way. Replace
V (.) by W(.) function, T(.) by Q(.),t (.) by q(.). Replace the inequality t(cL) >t (˜ co) above
by q(cL) <q (˜ co). With this follow exactly the same steps as in the previous Appendix till
25the end of the condition in (B1.1). Now note that W(Y2,q(cL),L) − W(Y2,q(cL),H) >
W(Xp,q(˜ co),L)−W(Xp,q(˜ co),H). This inequality holds because its LHS is equal to Y2∆c+
(∆c/4)(2α−2q(cL)−(cL+cH)) a n di t sR H Si se q u a lt oXp∆c+(∆c/4)(2α−2q(˜ co)−(cL+cH)).
The inequality is evident since Y2 >X p and q(cL) <q (˜ co). With this result in place, the rest
of the proof can be completed by following the remaining steps in Appendix B1.
Q.E.D.




H)=t(cH). Let the Cournot-Nash equilibrium in period
2 when Nature chooses cH be as stated in section 1 with t = t(cH) and c = cH. Next deﬁne
Y3 as the largest possible number such that V (Xm
H,t(cH),H)=V (Y3,t(cL),H). Computing
we get that Y3 = Xm
H +
s
4β(∆c)(6α − 9cH + β(∆c))
(9 − 2β)29/4
>X m
H. The inequality follows from
A s s u m p t i o nA 1 .N e x tn o t et h a ts i n c eV (X,.) is concave in X, V (Xm
H,t(cH),H) >V(Y3 +
ε,t(cL),H) for all ε > 0. Now set S(L)=max{Xm
L ,Y 3},B (S(L)) = 1, and T(B(S(L))) =
t(cL). Let the Cournot-Nash equilibrium in period 2 when Nature chooses cL be as stated
in section 1 with t = t(cL) and c = cL. Note that so far our proposed solution is sub-game
perfect, satisﬁes Baye’s rule and is sequentially rational for the government given its belief
function. We now need to show that it is sequentially rational for each ﬁrm-Type. To see
this, ﬁr s tn o t et h a tw h e nS(L)=Xm
L ≥ Y3 then the low-cost ﬁrm enjoys the best possible
beliefs and also obtains its monopoly-proﬁt in period 1. Thus, it has no incentive to deviate
irrespective of the structure of out of equilibrium beliefs. For the high cost ﬁrm we assume
that when Xm
L = Y3 so that it is indiﬀerent between deviating from Xm
H to Xm
L , then it
will not deviate. This is a standard tie-breaking assumption. When Xm
L >Y 3 then by
26construction of Y3 and the concavity of V (X,.) in X it follows that V (Xm
H,t(cH),H) >
V (Xm
L ,t(cL),H) so that the high-cost will not deviate even if the deviation were followed
by the most favorable belief. Thus, we have shown that when Xm
L ≥ Y3 then our stated
solution is sequentially rational. We note here that the previous inequality holds if and only
if ∆c ≥
(384α − 576cL)β
729 + 252β − 28β2 ≡ ∆ct where ∆ct is as discussed in section 3. We note that this
is the only possible separating equilibrium when Xm
L ≥ Y3. Simple way to see this is that
suppose S(L)=X1 6= Xm
L . We know from above that V (Xm
H,t(cH),H) >V(Y3+ε,t(cL),H)
∀²>0. Set ε =( 1 /2)(|X1 − Xm
L | ≡ ²1. It is direct to note that V (Xm
H,t(cH),H) >V(Xm
L +
ε1,t(cL),H) and V (Xm
L +²1,t(cL),L) >V(X1,t(cL),L) where the previous inequality follows
from the fact that Xm
L + ²1 is closer (in absolute value) to Xm
L than X1. The previous two
inequalities imply that B(Xm
L + ²1)=1by the Intuitive Cho-Kreps criterion. Thus, the
low-cost ﬁrm will always ﬁnd it optimal to from X1 to Xm
L +²1 since this increases its period
1p a y o ﬀ and leaves the government’s belief unchanged.
Now consider the remaining possibility when Y3 >X m
L or, equivalently, that ∆c<∆ct. Our
claim is that S(L)=Y3 is the unique intuitive separating equilibrium strategy for the low-cost
ﬁr m .T h ep r o o fi sa sf o l l o w s .S i n c eY3 >X m
L , concavity of V (.) in period 1 output implies
that V (Y3 + ε,t(cL),L) <V(Y3,t(cL),L) ∀ε > 0 so that the low-cost ﬁrm has no incentive
to deviate from Y3 to a higher output level. Next note that under the Intuitive criterion,
out of equilibrium beliefs are either 0 or 1. Further, when this criterion does not bind then
we assume the most pessimistic belief (B(.)=0 )for an out of equilibrium event which is a
common practice in the literature. Thus, when the low-cost ﬁrm deviates then the deviation
will be followed by either the most optimistic or the most pessimistic belief. In the latter
27case, the highest possible payoﬀ to the low-cost ﬁrm occurs when it deviates to its monopoly
output level. It can be checked with some algebra that V (Xm
L ,t(cH),L) <V(Y3,t(cL),L)
so that such a deviation will not occur. Now consider a deviation by the low-cost Type to
output level Y4 <Y 3 which is followed by the most optimistic belief. Since occurrence of Y4
is an out of equilibrium event we have that B(Y4)=1implies that the Cho-Kreps intuitive
criterion must apply at Y4. This requires that V (Xm
H,t(cH),H) <V (Y4,t(cL),H).T h i s
previous two inequalities implies that Y3 >Y 4 >X m
H −
s




It is direct to verify that Xm
L −Y −
3 >Y 3−Xm
L . Since V (X,.) is symmetric in X around Xm
L ,
the previous inequality implies that V (Y3,t(cL),L) >V(Y −
3 ,t(cL),L). Concavity of V (X.,)
in X and Y4 <Y−
3 together with the previous inequality then imply that V (Y3,t(cL),L) >
V (Y4,t(cL),L). Thus, the low-cost ﬁrm has no incentive to deviate to from Y3 to Y4. By
deﬁnition of Y3, we have already stated that our tie-breaking assumption implies that the
high-cost ﬁr mw i l ln o tw a n tt od e v i a t ef r o mXm
H even if the deviation is followed by the best
possible belief. Lastly, we need to establish that the separating equilibrium derived above
is the unique equilibrium. To this end, consider any possible separating equilibrium with
S(L)=X2 6= Y3. We maintain that Y3 >X m
L . If X2 >Y 3, then from the concavity of V (.)
in period 1 output, we have that V (X2,t(cL),L) <V(Y3 +²,t(cL),L) with 0 <²<X 2 −Y3.
By deﬁnition of Y3,V(Xm
H,t(cH),H) >V(Y3 + ²,t(cL),H) ∀²>0. These results imply that
under the Cho-Kreps intuitive criterion, B(Y3 + ²)=1 , 0 <²<X 2 − Y3. It is trivial to
note then that the low-cost ﬁrm will do better by deviating from X2 to aµ∗f
y point in the
interval (Y3,X 2). Thus, S(L)=X2 cannot be part of a separating equilibrium strategy.
Next consider the case when X2 <Y 3. As noted above, for this to be a possible separating
28equilibrium strategy, we must have X2 ≤ Y −
3 for otherwise the high-cost ﬁrm will deviate
from Xm
H and mimic the low-cost ﬁrm. Since Y −
3 <X m
L , the best possible scenario for the
low-cost ﬁrm occurs when X2 = Y −
3 and B(Y −
3 )=1 . Assume that this holds. We have
already noted above that Xm
L −Y −
3 >Y 3−Xm
L > 0. Since, V (X.,) is symmetric in X around
Xm
L , it follows that V (Y −
3 ,t(cL),L) <V(Y3,t(cL),L). Continuity of all our functions then
implies that V (Y −
3 ,t(cL),L) <V(Y3 + ε,t(cL),L) for ² ≈ 0 and strictly positive. Since the
high-cost ﬁrm is worse oﬀ in deviating to an output level higher than Y3 even when the
deviation is followed by the most optimistic belief, the Cho-Kreps intuitive criterion then
implies that B(Y3 + ε)=1for such an ² value. This together with the previous inequality
implies directly that the low-cost ﬁrm will deviate from X2 to Y3 +ε. Thus, we have proved
that the separating intuitive equilibrium above is the unique equilibrium of the game.
Q.E.D.
Appendix B4: Separating equilibrium in the quota regime
The basic structure of the arguments is exactly the same as in the previous Appendix. To
derive this ﬁrst make the same substitutions as outlined in Appendix B2. Then follows
the same steps as in Appendix B3. Solving we get that the unique separating intuitive
equilibrium here is: S(H)=Xm
H and S(L)=max{Xm
L ,y}, where y is obtained in the same




(3 + 2β)∆c[16α − 24cH +( 3+2 β)∆c]
4(9 − 2β)2 . With some algebra, it can checked that
max{Xm
L ,y} = Xm






] ≡ ∆cq which is as discussed in
section 3.
(The full proof is available on request.)
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